freedom of the will; they leave it as free as it is possible for it to be, in any intelligible sense of the term.

In prosecuting such inquiries as these, we find ourselves in view of two truths, which can be established on separate and independent evidence, and which must always be taken along with us in treating of intelligent creatures as under government. The one is, that man is a free agent and morally responsible to his Governor; and the other is, that he is physically dependent on his Creator. Each of these truths stands on its separate basis. The one can be established by consciousness and conscience ; and the other by reason and observation. Man, on the one hand, is conscious that he has a power of will and self-agency; and Ms conscience announces, as we shall show in the succeeding sections, that he is responsible. On the other hand, we are led by a fundamental law of belief to expect the law of cause and effect, to reign in mind as it reigns in matter; and we actually find the operation of such a law in the exercise of the will. Each truth is thus supported by its independent evidence; and it is therefore impossible that the two can be inconsistent. It is only through a confusion of ideas, through confounding the physical and the moral, that superficial thinkers are inclined to look upon them as contradictory.*

If any man assert^ that, in order to responsibility, the will must be free—that is, free from external restraint, free to make its choice, as well as free to act as it pleases—we at once and heartily agree with him ; we maintain, that in this sense the will

* The principle of contradiction is, that the same attribute cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time of the same subject. We are not violating it, when *we* assert that man has free will, and yet that causation Is found among his voluntary acts. In order to prove that we are violating it, it would be necessary to shew that freedom and non-causation are the same attribute. This is the very point in dispute, and cannot be settled by the principle of contradiction itself, nor indeed by any mere analytic or logical principle, but by synthetic evidence which cannot possibly be had. This remark admits of an application to

a vast host of other objections brought against the doctrines of religion, natural and revealed. The rationalists have been fond of asserting that there are contradictions in these doctrines to one another, or to established truths, but have seldom enunciated the principle of contradiction, or attempted to apply it in a rigid form. In philosophy, too, it has been for too readily admitted, since Kant propounded his Antinomies of Pure Eeason, that the dogmas of reason may contradict each other. We are certain that the contradiction lies not in the principles of reason, but in certain *a priori* representations of them. This is to be corrected by a cautious induction of them conducted in the Baconian method